Wednesday 24 June 2015

Rats of Shah Daula's shrine


What was the first thing you thought of after looking at above picture? I am sure you must have thought that the guy in picture must be suffering from some genetic disorder or disease which has made him look so woeful. But this is not the case with him or with thousands of his kind, he is one of ten thousands of “Rats of Shah Dola” or “Dolay Shah de Chohay”. Their heads were donned with iron helmets when they were infants to make sure that their head don’t grow naturally and they don’t have a normal healthy life. A very sad and sickening story is on your way.
A saint belonging from Seherwardi School of thought from Aurangzeb Era, Shah Dola in Gujrat (Punjab, Pakistan) claimed that he had the power to punish the disobedient parents in the form of children with small heads. He used to put an iron cap on children and get them to his shrine to help him by begging and getting him money, those ill-fated children were called as “Rats of Shah Dola” or Dola Shah ke Chouhey. From then this sickening ritual actually started. People started to believe that Shah Daula has the power of making incapable women fertile, it was also made famous that those women who were blessed with children after praying at the shrine will donate their first born baby to shrine to be a “Rat of Shah Dola” or the rest of their children will born disabled. So as a result thousands of women visit the shrine every month and hundreds of newly born babies are left at the shrine to become a Rat of Shah Daula’s Shrine, making him mentally handicapped and spending all his life being dependant on others.

There may be above 10,000 Rats of Shah Daulas in Pakistan. Most of them are in Punjab specially in the city of Gujrat who beg for Shah Dola’s Shrine. This is a very sad example of human rights violation that too in the name of religion, people make use of the religion for their personal gains more often than not.
The saddest part is the role of people in this issue. They are too patsy to pray on a shrine to get blessed with a child and leave their newly born babies in the premises of shrine to get his head donned in a steel helmet and to spend his whole life begging for the shrine being a mentally retard. No role of government have been observed lately to stop this inhumane practice and by the look of it, it seems like this practice is going to continue in years and years to come.
Bilal zahid 

Sunday 3 May 2015

NLC INTERNSHIP OPPORTUNITIES

National Logistics Cell (NLC) is offering paid and unpaid short-term Internship programs of (4, 6, 8 and 12 weeks only) to fresh Under Graduate / Graduate / Post Graduate / Technical students of well renowned universities / institutions for under mentioned discipline at Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi and various other setups of NLC:-
  1. Civil / Electrical / Mechanical Engineers
  2. IT Engineers / Software Developers
  3. Human Resource
  4. Marketing
  5. Finance
  6. Supply Chain Management
  7. Technical Diploma Holders (Minimum 1 year) for Civil and IT related domains.
Prerequisite for Internship. Internship will be offered for fol 2 quarters:-

  1. 1st July 2015  to        30 Sep 2015 (1st Quarter)
  2. 1st Oct 2015 to           31 Dec 2015 (2nd Quarter)
Paid InternshipPaid Internship is being offered as under:-
  • Eligibility. Master / Bachelor Degree with minimum CGPA 2.75 from a recognized National / Foreign universities / Institutes and minimum 1 year Technical diploma holders from a recognized institute of Federal / Provincial Govt.  
  • Duration for Paid InternshipFor a period of 3 months only. Payment of Stipend shall strictly be subject to 95% minimum attendance.
  • StipendPayment of Stipend will be as per NLC Policy.
Unpaid Internship:-
  • Eligibility.  Unpaid internship will be granted to the students who are under study graduates (as per the requirement of Institution and University) of well renowned universities / institutions.
  • Duration for Unpaid InternshipFor a period of 4, 6 & 8 weeks only with no period of absence except in extreme emergency included medical, death etc.
  • Stipend.        -           Not Admissible. 
  • Refrence Link :
  • Contact Us

    Office will remain open from Monday to Friday, 8:30 am To 3:30 pm
    Our Contact Address is:

    Human Resource Department
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    PO Box No. 514 | Rawalpindi Pakistan
    Tel: +92 (51) 111-652-000 | hr@nlc.com.pk
 http://careers.nlc.com.pk/internship/Interninfo

Sunday 5 April 2015

Afghan Taliban publish Mullah Omar biography

The Afghan Taliban have published a descriptive biography of Mullah Omar, their "charismatic" supreme leader, in a move apparently aimed at countering the influence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) group within its ranks.
The biography, posted just on Sunday on the Taliban's main website to commemorate Omar's 19th year as supreme leader, described him as being actively involved in "jihadi activities", dispelling speculation that he had died.
The Taliban have reportedly seen defections to the ISIL in recent months, with some rebels expressing their disaffection with the one-eyed warrior-cleric who has not been seen since the 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan.
Despite being "regularly tracked by the enemy, no major change and disruption has been observed in the routine works of [Omar] in... organising the jihadi activities as the leader of the Islamic Emirate," the biography said.
"He keenly follows and inspects the... activities against the brutal infidel foreign invaders."
Lionising the "charismatic personality", the biography also contained several anecdotes of battlefield valour and described the RPG-7 grenade launcher as Omar's "preferred weapon of choice".
Surprising details
The withdrawn, remote figure has not made a public appearance since the 2001 invasion, and has hardly ever been photographed.
The US State Department - which has a $10m bounty on Omar's head - only describes him as a tall male with a shrapnel wound to the right eye.
The Taliban's surprise move to release his richly-detailed biography, even describing his personal and family life, took security analysts by surprise.
"The Taliban have posted Omar's biography for several strategic reasons - the most important of which is to counter Daesh influence in their ranks," said Ahmad Sayedi, an expert on the Taliban, alluding to the Arabic abbreviation for ISIL.
"This announcement is also meant to show that Omar is alive and well and still in control as the supreme leader of the Taliban."
In the past 13 years, Omar has stayed completely out of the public eye amid growing power struggles within the Taliban and fears of ISIL's influence in their ranks as an ideological rival.
The Afghan government has also raised the ominous prospect of ISIL making inroads into the country, though the group that has taken over swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria has never formally acknowledged having a presence in Afghanistan.
Source : AFP

Sunday 30 November 2014

Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif has said that he has always spoken against the VIP culture.

MULTAN: Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif has said that he has always spoken against the VIP culture.
In an exclusive chat with SAMAA today, Chief Minister Sharif, who was leading a small convoy to meet flood affectees in Multan, said that on one hand, Imran Khan talks about the VIP culture, on the other hand he travels by a chopper.
Sharif said that Imran Khan led a convoy of 20 vehicles in Mianwali to reach the venue of his public meeting.
 The Punjab chief minister stated that Khan’s motorcade in Karachi comprises of 50 vehicles. 

Jamat-e-Islami is against the ‘Plan C’ announced by Imran Khan on Sunday

ISLAMABAD: Jamat-e-Islami, which is in a coalition government in Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf-led (PTI) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government, announced that it is against the ‘Plan C’ announced by Imran Khan on Sunday.

Earlier, speaking to hundreds of thousands of his supporters in Islamabad, Khan announced that he would jam Pakistan on December 16 under his party’s “Plan C.”

“I will first shut down Lahore, Faisalabad, Karachi, on December 4, 8, 12 respectively then I will move on to bring the whole Pakistan to a grinding halt. And my 'Plan D will come to fore after Dec 16”, Khan said laying bare his 'most awaited' 'Plan C' at a mammoth rally in Islamabad.
In a statement issued here Sunday, Jamat-e-Islami’s political secretary suggested both the opposition party and the government to resume dialogue process to end political stalemate. -Samaa

Wednesday 26 November 2014

Af-Pak a frontline against IS goals



Af-Pak a frontline against IS goals



Early in October, six leaders of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a terrorist group based in northwestern Pakistan, announced their allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) and to the self-declared Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. While this was yet another indication of the steady percolation of IS into terrorist groups based in Pakistan, the implications will not be limited to national security alone.

The porous borders, historical narratives, and ideological leanings of the group will ensure that the effects will cut across social,




economic, and humanitarian lines, unless there is an understanding of the IS's perspectives towards the region. Pakistan is more vulnerable to that risk than other countries.

The keyword is Khurasan
The IS believes that all territories historically ruled by Muslims and later conquered by non-Muslims and/or allegedly non-Islamic forms of governance were wrongfully taken from them; and intend to reclaim it. When the IS unilaterally declared a "Caliphate" in Syria and Iraq, it also released a map highlighting the territories it aims to control in future.

The present-day territories of Afghanistan and Pakistan form the heart of the historical Greater Khurasan region highlighted in the map, which includes parts of modern-day Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and parts of western China.

Given the IS's specific ideological leaning and approach, today's nation-states are irrelevant for the group. The IS views the region only as Khurasan and will try to replicate precisely what it has done in Iraq and Syria: to undo modern political borders that separate countries in the region.

Already, IS propaganda material and declarations of allegiances have begun to crop up in various parts of Pakistan, with the latest being wall-chalking supporting the group, not too far from Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's Lahore residence.

However, the IS is not the only group that has its eyes set on the coveted Khurasan. The new TTP chief, Mullah Fazlullah, who fancies himself as the father of the Khurasan movement in Pakistan, and the relatively unknown group, Jaish-e-Khurasan, among others in Pakistan and Afghanistan, are also reclaiming Khurasan in their agendas.

Although the Pakistani military launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb to flush out militants from the country's Federally Administered Tribal Areas earlier this year, the result has been to bring closer together the militants with like-minded counterparts in the bordering Afghan provinces of Kunar, Khost and Nuristan.

These provinces and the region along the Durand Line will become the epicenter of the turf war between these groups and the IS in the attempt to reclaim and control the historical Khurasan. While it is unlikely that the scale of breakdown of law and order will be on the lines of what is unraveling in Iraq and Syria, other implications will threaten to rip the very fabric of society in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the neighboring Central Asian countries.

Salafi catalyst in insecurity
Pakistan, though formed as a homeland state for Muslims, has, over the years, witnessed nationwide Sunni-ization. Minority communities are often targeted by violent hardline Salafi Islamists for their beliefs. In the past several months, non-Sunni Muslims, especially Shi'ites and Ahmadiyyas, have been targeted with terror attacks and mass killings.

Intolerance towards ethno-sectarian minorities can be understood via the attacks on the Shi'ite Hazara community in Balochistan. The Pakistani government's indifferent attitude towards ethno-sectarian violence is not just disconcerting in general, but also, on a practical level, detrimental to the country's security as a whole.

While sectarian violence in Afghanistan isn't as pronounced as it is in Pakistan - especially given how Afghanistan suffers more from ethnic rivalries than sectarianism - any grip of the IS on the country could trigger sectarian violence by terrorist groups competing for legitimacy among their peers and potential sympathizers. Pakistan-based groups, in conjunction with counterparts in Afghanistan will try to one up the IS, resulting in human tragedies.

The ongoing withdrawal of Western forces has brought Afghanistan to a delicate point in time, despite the high competency of the Afghan National Security Forces, and this could be exploited by the groups competing to control the region.

Central Asia, which has witnessed increasing Salafi Islamization among its younger generations over the past few years, has also exhibited a growing tendency of intolerance towards Shi'ites - something that wasn't the case until recently. The attraction towards the status of the Arab world in Central Asian countries, that takes precedence in comparison to that of the plight of Muslims elsewhere in the world - combined with the 1,300-year old prophecy in the Hadith about a Malahim (day of reckoning) in Dabiq, Syria, that the IS uses to recruit and gain sympathy among masses - has the potential to destabilize the social fabric of the region.

The difference will be noted in al-Qaeda's approach towards sectarianism in comparison to the IS approach. Al-Qaeda, thought a violent Islamist terrorist group, never sought the absolute elimination of the Shi'ites. Conversely, the IS policies are as much about the elimination of Shi'ites as their goal to expand the borders of the "Islamic Caliphate".

This could again lead to the softening of opinions about al-Qaeda, among the people. While most residents of the region may not approve of al-Qaeda, in the face of two evils, the masses will choose the lesser evil; and the numbers will matter because the relatively non-anti-Shi'ite policies of al-Qaeda will, comparatively, resonate positively among Shi'ites, who cumulatively make up a considerable chunk of region's population.

The new resources curse 
The Afghanistan-Turkmenistan border, which is already teeming with Salafi Islamists, could become problematic for Afghanistan. The comparatively weak structure of the Kyrgyz governmental systems could easily be taken advantage of to gain a foothold in the country. Tajik oil fields could become especially accessible to the resource-seeking IS, if the group manages to get an anchor in the eastern region of the country. Afghanistan too is flush with resources - tapping which is mostly only held up because of security problems.

Essentially, the draw of resources that can fund the caliphate combined with the historical narrative of greater Khurasan together have the potential to hit the region where it hurts most: in its social fabric. Given the complex multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious nature of western South Asia and Central Asia, any shift in balance in the social construct would set the region back by decades.

Afghan linchpin
Afghanistan is the linchpin that has the potential to play decision-maker, as the fight for Khurasan is likely to culminate in a showdown in the country, especially at the Af-Pak border along the Durand Line. If all regional countries work together in conjunction with Kabul to ensure the stability in Afghanistan post the withdrawal of Western troops, the region will be better guarded to fight the new threat.

The Khurasan narrative is extremely central to dealing with this menace, for, the terrorists view the region from the point of view of a single construct, and their planning will be on similar lines. Therefore, if the Khurasan narrative is studied and understood thoroughly, and if planned well, Afghanistan could, together with Iran and the Central Asian countries, be the torchbearer in halting the eastward advance of the IS.

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